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THE REMOVAL, INVOLUNTARY RETIREMENT AND
CENSURE OF FEDERAL JUDGES: THE
JUDICIAL TENURE ACT IN CONTEXT
The American legal system has long been concerned with the re-
moval, involuntary retirement and censure of judges whose actions are
inappropriate to their office. This issue is framed by two equally im-
portant but seemingly contradictory considerations. In order to main-
tain both the appearance and fact of impartiality, judges must be
guaranteed some degree of independence from external control.' That
independence must be limited, however, to prevent it from becoming a
shield that perpetuates misbehavior.' In order to explore the practical
realities of this problem, this comment describes and evaluates the Ju-
dicial Tenure Act (the Act).' The Act, submitted for the consideration
of the 95th Congress4 by Senator Sam Nunn (D. Georgia), delineates
standards and procedures governing the removal, involuntary retire-
ment and censure 5 of federal judges.
As is the case with potential solutions to most problems, it is appro-
priate to examine and evaluate the Act in context. The aspect of con-
text that seems most relevant in this instance is that of previous
attempts to resolve the conflict between the need for judicial indepen-
dence and the countervailing need for limits upon that independence.
As a consequence, the first section of this comment describes an evalua-
1. See, e.g., Nunn, The Judicial Tenure Act, TRIAL, November 1977, 26, 28 [hereinafter
cited as Nunn]; Comment, Judicial Discipline, Removal, and Retirement, 1976 Wis. L. REv.
563, 563 [hereinafter cited as Judicial Discioline].
2. See, e.g., Boyd, Removing Federal Judges.- An Alternative to Impeachment, 49 L.A.B.
BULL. 416, 436 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Removing Federal Judges]; Nunn, supra note 1, at
28; Judicial Discpline, supra note 1, at 563.
3. At the time of publication, the Act was not yet passed into law. It was introduced in
the Senate as S. 1423, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 CONG. REc. 56782 (daily ed. April 29, 1977).
Amended on the Senate floor. 124 CONG. REC. S14781 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978). Passed in
the Senate as amended. 124 CONG. REC. S14782 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978). Since the subse-
quently adopted amendments to S. 1423 were contained in S. REP. No. 1035, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1035], that report will hereafter be cited in
place of S. 1423.
4. Similar bills were introduced previously by Senator Nunn (S. 1110, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 5720 (1975); S. 4153, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG REC. 36066
(1974)) and by Senator Tydings (S. 1506, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 6220 (1969);
S. 3055, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CONG. REc. 4561 (1968)).
5. S. REP. No. 1035, supra note 3, at 1-2. Hereinafter, the terms removal, involuntary
retirement, and censure, on occasion, will be collectively or singularly subsumed under the
term "tenure."
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tion framework that is used in the second and third sections to assess
the procedural strengths and weaknesses of traditional and modem ap-
proaches to judicial tenure. The fourth section of this comment applies
the same framework to the system proposed in the Judicial Tenure Act.
As in sections two and three, the evaluation is concerned with the as-
sessment of procedural strengths and weaknesses. In addition, issues
are raised regarding potential constitutional and philosophical
problems arising from this approach to judicial tenure.
I. EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
An evaluation framework is utilized here that specifies the major fac-
tors that should be taken into account in a critical examination of the
various approaches to judicial tenure. These factors are drawn in part
from the legal literature on the subject and in part from the author's
analysis of the tenure issue. The factors that emerge are: (1) confiden-
tiality regarding the identity of judges against whom charges are
brought; (2) validity of procedures for evaluating charges; (3) flexibility
in choice of sanction imposed upon guilty judges; and (4) efficiency of
use of economic and human resources.
The first issue, confidentiality, concerns protecting the anonymity of
the judge against whom charges have been brought. Procedures in
which confidentiality is not maintained have one distinct advantage;
the existence of at least an appearance of openness suggests that any
charges levied will be resolved without resort to illicit machinations. A
public examination of charges also allows immediate feedback to any
interested party on the responsiveness of the procedure vis-A-vis action
upon any individual complaint.
This very openness poses two potential problems. First, a judge
against whom an unmeritorious claim has been pressed may well be
unable to remove the taint from his reputation, even after having been
cleared of all charges. As folk wisdom suggests, charges are generally
made on the front page, retractions on the last. Second, if all stages of
the procedure are open to public scrutiny, a judge who is in fact guilty
of any of the charges has no incentive to shorten the process by admit-
ting guilt and retiring voluntarily. Once charges have been made pub-
lic, one who chooses to resist has little more to lose than one who
attempts to make a graceful withdrawal.
The second issue, evaluation of charges, relates to the procedure by
which charges are determined to be valid or spurious. Within this issue
are two considerations: (1) whether the process by which the charges
are investigated is one that is likely to ascertain the truth, and (2)
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whether decision makers are qualified to make a final determination of
that truth. A failure of either of these elements can result in persecu-
tion of the blameless or a vindication of the blameworthy.
The third issue, flexibility of sanction, acknowledges that different
types and degrees of misconduct may require different punitive re-
sponses. Some incidences of misconduct may require removal, while
others may be enjoined satisfactorily by milder disciplinary action.
The issue of flexibility of sanction is tied necessarily and closely to the
issue of confidentiality. If the entire procedure is open to public scru-
tiny, sufficient damage to a judge's reputation may be accomplished
merely by bringing and evaluating charges publicly, so that the availa-
bility of anything short of removal, tie., milder disciplinary action,
would be unnecessary.
The final issue, efficiency of the overall procedure, relates to the
practical utility of the process. If, for example, evaluating charges and
sanctioning misconduct require the involvement of a large number of
people and/or impose an extreme economic burden, the process is not
likely to be initiated in all cases in which it would be appropriate. The
evaluation of alternative judicial tenure procedures discussed below fo-
cuses on these four issues. When relevant, idiosyncratic considerations
are also discussed.
II. TRADITIONAL PROCEDURES
A. Impeachment
One of the most widely available procedures for the removal of
judges is impeachment.6 Impeachment is the proceeding in which the
lower house of a legislature, acting in a manner similar to a grand jury,
votes a bill of impeachment, and the upper house, sitting as a court,
tries the impeachment.' Generally, two-thirds of the members of the
upper house who are present can convict.8 Their judgment cannot ex-
tend beyond removal and disqualification from office.9
An evaluation of the impeachment process discloses several limita-
tions. With regard to the issue of confidentiality, all features of a sys-
tem that lacks confidentiality apply, since there are no provisions for
shielding the identity of judges against whom charges have been filed.
6. Procedures for impeachment can be found in 46 state constitutions and the United
States Constitution. W. BRAITHWAITE, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 3 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL].
7. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. § 3, cl. 6.
8. Eg., id. § 3, cl. 6.
9. Eg., id. § 3, cl. 7.
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On the positive side, the openness inherent in the impeachment process
should theoretically result in a public opinion that the system is not
only responsive (i e., attendant to complaints) but also just (I e., no il-
licit machinations). On the negative side, the lack of confidentiality
can result in irreparably damaged reputations,'" that may destroy the
judicial effectiveness of those who are impeached but not convicted. In
addition, once initiated, the impeachment process does not afford any
incentive for a guilty party to admit guilt and retire voluntarily. " Once
the process has begun, virtually all forseeable damage to reputation has
already occurred. 2 Therefore, one who fights the impeachment is not
likely to be damaged significantly more than one who does not. How-
ever, one who resists may be able to prevent conviction.
The second area requiring attention is the procedure for the evalua-
tion of charges. The impeachment process provides no formal proce-
dures for the preliminary evaluation of complaints. As a result, one
must assume that complaints are, at first, only informally judged as to
merit; in other words, the claim is initially evaluated in whatever man-
ner the legislative representative who has been apprised of it considers
proper. The result, because of both the limited resources and experi-
ence of any given legislator, 'I may be that meritorious claims are ig-
nored and trivial ones are prosecuted.
Once past the informal preliminary evaluation, but prior to voting a
bill of impeachment, legislative fact-finding, such as would precede the
passage of any bill, probably occurs. Since no specific procedure is re-
quired, the utility of this stage of the process can neither be evaluated
nor relied upon heavily.
Once the bill of impeachment has been voted, the trial of impeach-
ment begins. While more formal than prior phases, the trial is not nec-
essarily more productive of the truth. It has been suggested on
numerous occasions that trials of impeachment are more political than
judicial in nature.' 4 If this is true, the determination of the validity of
10. See, e.g., Judicial Discpline, supra note I, at 566.
11. See W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES? 67 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES]. (Although in the cited passage the author was discussing courts
on the judiciary, which are treated in section II4. of this paper, the same argument applies
to any procedure in which confidentiality, at least at the preliminary stages, is not assured).
12. Id
13. Legislators, because of their lack of judicial experience and lack of sufficient time,
may not be appropriate parties for making final decisions on the merits of charges in im-
peachment trials. See note 16 infra. It follows that they may be an equally inappropriate
choice for initially determining the merits of those same charges.
14. See, e.g., Andrews, Judicial Removal of Federal Judges, I 1 GA. S.B.J. 157, 158 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Andrews]; Judicial Discpline, supra note 1, at 566; Comment, Judicial
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the charges may well be made on bases other than guilt or innocence. 5
Further, it has been suggested that even if the proceedings were truly
judicial in nature, legislators may not be the most qualified to make
such a determination since they are inexperienced with and lack the
time for undertaking the role of judge.'
6
In terms of flexibility of sanction, the third evaluation issue, im-
peachment must also be found lacking. The only sanction available is
removal from office.' 7 As mentioned earlier, this limitation on the
range of available sanctions could prove to be a serious problem. Not
all forms of misconduct necessarily require removal;' 8 some may war-
rant only a reprimand. When such an alternative is lacking, those in
authority are faced with two untenable alternatives: they can either
overreact to minor infractions or ignore them. The alternatives are
equally inappropriate. Without flexibility of sanction, no third alterna-
tive that would tailor the remedy to the problem is available.
Finally, one must examine impeachment in terms of its overall effi-
ciency. It has often been said that impeachment is cumbersome and
time consuming.' 9 Since it requires the attention of an entire legisla-
ture for considerable periods of time,20 "cumbersome and time con-
suming" may be an understatement. The logical result is that
impeachment is a procedure that either incurs extreme costs or is not
frequently used. If the latter is correct, the result must necessarily be
an abundance of unredressed minor (and perhaps even major) infrac-
tions of the appropriate standards of judicial conduct.2'
Thus, there are several reasons that impeachment is, and has been,
Discoiline in Calfornia. A Critical Re-Evaluation, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 192, 197 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Judicial Discipline in California].
15. It has been claimed, for example, that in the first impeachment of a judge in Califor-
nia the primary motivation for conviction was a political vendetta, rather than meritorious
charges. Stewart, Impeachment of James H. Hardy, 1862, 28 S. CAL. L. REV. 61, 67 (1954).
16. See, e.g., Cole, Dirciline, Removal or Exoneration of Alabama Jurists, 5 CUM.-SAM.
L. REV. 214, 217 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Cole]; Judicial Discpline, supra note 1, at 566;
Comment, The Procedures of JudicialDiscpline, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 190, 196-97 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as Procedures of Judicial Disciline].
17. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
18. Finch, Judicial Selection and Tenure, 70 F.R.D. 239, 243 (1976).
19. E.g., Andrews, supra note 14, at 157; Boyd, Federal Judges: To *hom Must They
Answer? 61 A.B.A.J. 324, 324 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Federal Judges]; Judicial Discpline
in California, supra note 14, at 196; Note, Judicial Disciline-The North Carolina Commis-
sion System, 54 N.C.L. REV. 1074, 1075 (1976) [hereinafter cited as North Carolina Commis-
sion System].
20. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 16, at 217.
21. E.g., Judicial Discipline in Caifornia, supra note 14, at 196.
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rarely used.22 Among those reasons are the facts that impeachment
does not insure confidentiality at even the earliest stages, does not pro-
vide a formal procedure for the evaluation of charges, does not allow
for flexible sanctions, and is not an efficient use of economic and
human resources.
B. Address
The address procedure2 3 is similar to impeachment and is available
in a majority of the states.24 This procedure generally requires that
both houses of a legislature formally request that the governor remove
a judge.2 5 After the required two-thirds vote of both houses produces
the request, either the judge is automatically removed, or the governor
is required to remove him from office.26
An evaluation of the address procedure results in many of the same
criticisms leveled against the impeachment process. The lack of confi-
dentiality and flexibility of sanction are as prevalent in the address
process u7 as they are in the impeachment process. In both cases re-
moval is the only option and proceedings are totally public. As a re-
sult, the problems of unwarranted damage to reputation and a lack of
appropriate sanctions exist as well.a8
As discussed below, the theoretically different procedures for evalu-
ating charges in address and impeachment are in practice probably
very similar. In both cases, by default, any preliminary evaluation that
occurs is at the discretion of the legislator who is first apprised of the
complaint. As a result, the utility of this initial evaluation is unknown.
The next step in the evaluation process, the request procedure, ap-
pears to be the equivalent of a bill of impeachment. There is, however,
a difference because the request procedure originates in both houses,
rather than in one. In both cases, legislative fact-finding, which would
22. Over the course of our two hundred years as a nation, only 54 judges and one
justice [on the federal bench] have been officially investigated. Of these only eight
judges and one justice have been successfully impeached by the House, resulting in the
conviction and removal of a mere four judges in two centuries.
Nunn, supra note 1, at 28.
23. In some jurisdictions, including California, a procedure having the same provisions as
address is referred to as "concurrent resolution." Judicial Disc4lline in California, supra note
14, at 193 n.3.
24. The address procedure, in some form, can be found in twenty-eight states. JUDICIAL
DIsCIPLINE AND REMOVAL, supra note 6, at 3.
25. Id
26. Id
27. Id
28. See notes 10-12, 17 supra and accompanying text.
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precede the passage of any bill, probably occurs but in neither case is it
formally required or regulated. While impeachment involves the addi-
tional requirement of a trial in the upper house, this is perhaps func-
tionally offset by the fact that, in address, both houses must vote for
removal.
Regardless of whether the disciplinary process requires a vote by one
house and trial by the other or a vote by both houses, the decision still
seems to be essentially political.29 As a result, in the final analysis, the
decision may be based on issues other than guilt or innocence of the
judge.30 Further compounding the problem in both address and im-
peachment is the fact that there are grave concerns about the qualifica-
tions of legislators to make such a determination." The result then,
because of their operative similarities, is that procedures for the evalua-
tion of charges in address and impeachment are equally deficient.
Finally, in terms of overall efficiency, address has been characterized
as unduly time consuming.32 While the functions of the two legislative
houses are different in impeachment and address, considering the im-
portance of the issue (guilt or innocence) the time expended in either
process must be substantial.
In conclusion, though procedurally distinguishable from impeach-
ment, address seems susceptible to the same criticisms. Probably as a
result, it is used as rarely as impeachment.
33
C. Recall
Recall is available in only a few of the states.3 4 The process is initi-
ated by the electorate rather than the legislature. If a specified percent-
age of the electorate sign a petition for recall, a judge must face a
special election.35 If the judge fails to receive the required proportion
of votes in that election, he is removed from office. 6
As is the case with both impeachment and address, recall does not
provide for confidentiality since the entire process is initiated and car-
ried out by the public. Further, there is no flexibility of sanction since
29. See, e.g., Judicial Discipline, supra note 1, at 566.
30. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
31. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Judicial Discipline in Caifornia, supra note 14, at 200; North Carolina Com-
mission System, supra note 19, at 1075.
33. See Judicial Discipline, supra note 1, at 565-66.
34. Recall can be found in seven states. JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL, supra note
6, at 3.
35. Id
36. Id
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removal is the only sanction provided for by law. 7 As a result, recall is
subject to the same initial criticism as impeachment and address; there
are no controls on unwarranted damage to reputation or inappropriate
sanction.38
Conversely, one must note the striking differences between impeach-
ment and address on the one hand and recall on the other with respect
to procedures for the evaluation of charges. Recall provides no proce-
dures for the evaluation of charges, 39 while impeachment and address
both provide informal initial evaluation procedures and formal quasi-
judicial (impeachment) or legislative (address) final evaluation proce-
dures. Additionally, since there is no formal body responsible for the
evaluation of charges, each member of the electorate must assume the
responsibility of determining a judge's guilt or innocence. 40 If the pro-
cedures employed in impeachment and address are found lacking, it
follows that the haphazard procedures in the recall process must be
considered even more inadequate.
Finally, with regard to overall efficiency, recall, like impeachment
41and address, has been said to be both time consuming and expensive.
However, in recall the consumption of both economic and human re-
sources affects entities other than those affected by impeachment and
address. In the latter procedures, the legislature, ie., the taxpayers in
general, bears the brunt of the resource expenditure. In the case of
recall, those most involved in the recall campaign must bear the major
burden for they are the ones most likely to contribute time or money.
As a result, not only are the costs high,42 but they are allocated among
only a relative few, while potentially all stand to gain or lose by the
expenditure.
In conclusion, recall, like impeachment and address, is sorely lacking
with regard to all four evaluation categories. As a result, it is beset with
similar problems.
37. Id
38. See notes 10-12, 17 supra and accompanying text.
39. Eg., Frankel, Judicial Conduct and Removal of Judgesfor Cause in Caifornia, 36 S.
CAL. L. REy. 72, 75-76 (1962).
40. Since legislators probably do not have sufficient time or expertise to evaluate charges
against judges, see note 16, supra, it would be difficult to argue that the electorate in general
is any more qualified. See, e.g., Judicial Discipline in California, supra note 14, at 198 n.23.
41. See, e.g., Judicial Discipline, supra note 1, at 566; Judicial Discipline in California,
supra note 14, at 198.
42. See, e.g., Judicial Discipline in California, supra note 14, at 198.
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III. MODERN PROCEDURES
A. Courts on the Judiciary
Originally employed in New York, the court on the judiciary plan
has found acceptance in several other states." There are two basic ver-
sions of this system now in use.' In one instance, the court on the
judiciary is a specially constituted court comprised of selected judges
from the appellate and trial court levels. In other instances, charges are
heard before an existing court, e.g., the state supreme court. Generally,
the court is convened when a complaint is filed. Usually complaints
can be filed only by specified individuals. After a bench trial, either the
complaint is dismissed, or the judge is removed or involuntarily retired.
With regard to the first evaluation issue, confidentiality, the court on
the judiciary plan provides none45 and therefore represents no im-
provement over the traditional procedures. As previously discussed,
one of the more apparent consequences of this lack of confidentiality is
the possibility of discrediting or embarassing judges even though com-
plaints may ultimately prove groundless.4 6 In addition, this lack of
confidentiality provides no inducement for guilty judges to resign or
retire, thereby shortening the process.47 Thus, the lack of confidential-
ity opens the court process to the same criticisms leveled at traditional
procedures.
With regard to the evaluation of charges, the court on the judiciary
plan is a vast improvement over traditional procedures, at least in
terms of the ultimate evaluation process. The final determination of
guilt or innocence is made through a formal judicial process.48 As a
result, the probability of ascertaining the truth should be greater than
in the less rigorous, quasi-judicial (impeachment), legislative (address),
or electoral (recall) processes.
However, there is still a weakness in the evaluation process. The
weakness is that no preliminary evaluation of charges takes place.49
All charges from qualified sources, when a qualification requirement
43. The court on the judiciary plan has been adopted in some form in five states, and
Puerto Rico. Cole, supra note 16, at 219.
44. The following description of courts on the judiciary is drawn from JUDICIAL DIscI-
PLINE AND REMOVAL, supra note 6, at 4.
45. WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES, supra note 11, at 66; Judicial Discipline, supra note 1, at
568.
46. Judicial Discipline, supra note 1, at 568.
47. WHo JUDGES THE JUDGES, supra note 11, at 67.
48. See JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL, supra note 6, at 4; WHO JUDGES THE
JUDGES, supra note 11, at 57.
49. See, e.g., Judicial Discipline, supra note 1, at 568.
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exists, 50 must go to a bench trial in order to be resolved.-' When this
fact is combined with the lack of confidentiality, the risk of harming the
reputation of innocent judges is significantly increased.52
The issue of flexibility of sanction does not favor the court on the
judiciary plan. In cases not warranting removal, the court has no disci-
plinary capacity. 3 As a result, since there is insufficient flexibility to
tailor the sanction to the infraction, relatively minor infractions must
be punished either too severely or not at all.
5 4
Finally, in terms of overall efficiency of procedure, the court system
must receive high marks. Although the court may be required to con-
vene in order to hear charges that could have been proven meritless by
simple investigation, the court process must be considered a relatively
economical use of time and money. This is especially true when com-
pared with more traditional methods, which require the time and cost
associated with full legislative or electoral processes. In the legislative
process, the costs associated with the number of people involved in
making use of both legislative houses clearly outweigh those that are
necessary for a bench trial. Similarly, the costs involved in holding a
recall election must, by sheer weight of numbers, exceed the costs at-
tendant to a bench trial.
In conclusion, the court system provides no improvement over the
traditional approaches in terms of confidentiality and flexibility of
sanction. It does, however, improve upon the procedures for the final
evaluation of charges, although no improvement is made with regard to
initial evaluation. Finally, the court system has the potential for
greater efficiency than any of the previously discussed alternatives.
B. Judicial Qualfications Commissions
California was the first state to adopt a judicial qualifications com-
mission (Commission). Many other states are now following suit.56
Commissions are normally composed of judges, lawyers, and lay per-
50. In New York, for example, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, the Governor,
any one of the four presiding justices of the appellate division, or a majority of the executive
committee of the state bar association may initiate procedures to convene the court. WHo
JUDGES THE JUDGES, supra note 11, at 57.
51. In New York, however, the legislature may preempt the court's jurisdiction and make
the final and conclusive determination itself. Id
52. See, e.g., Yd at 67.
53. Id.
54. See text accompanying and following note 17 supra.
55. Cole, supra note 16, at 220.
56. Judicial qualification commissions can be found in thirty-three states and the District
of Columbia. Id at 219.
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sons.57 Complaints usually may be filed by any individual. The Com-
mission is flexible in its evaluation of complaints and may reject
unfounded ones or merely caution a judge if the complaint is not very
serious. If the Commission believes that a complaint is of a serious
nature (and supported by fact) it may order formal hearings before the
Commission or a panel of masters or referees. At the hearing, the ac-
cused judge is presented with the charges and given an opportunity to
defend against those charges. After the hearing, the Commission may
dismiss the charges, or recommend retirement, removal, or other disci-
plinary action. In the case of the latter three alternatives, the jurisdic-
tion's highest court must make the final disposition. Generally, all
proceedings prior to the final disposition are confidential and all testi-
mony is privileged against defamation claims.
Since a version of the Commission system forms the basis of the Ju-
dicial Tenure Act, a full evaluation of that version will be made in the
next section. However, some preliminary comments as to the system in
general are appropriate here. First, with regard to the issue of confi-
dentiality, the Commission system provides for confidentiality during
all but the final steps in the process. 8 This policy should provide a
remedy for some of the problems facing the previously discussed alter-
natives. The likelihood that reputations will be injured by unfounded
charges should be greatly decreased, since charges that are invalid are
more likely to be eliminated before confidentiality is breached. In ad-
dition, there is a greater incentive for guilty judges to retire. Since no
damage to reputation is likely to occur in the preliminary stages of
evaluation, retirement can be a graceful way out.
Second, in terms of the evaluation of charges, the Commission sys-
tem provides both informal and formal mechanisms for preliminary
evaluation. Such evaluations are conducted by both professionals in
the legal field (judges and lawyers) and lay people.59 The first level of
evaluation is an informal initial evaluation conducted by the Commis-
sion staff. Charges that are patently frivolous are dismissed immedi-
ately.60 Those claims that appear to be of a serious nature, and are
supported by fact, are subject to a formal hearing.61 Furthermore, an
additional level of decision-making occurs. A supreme court must re-
view the Commission's recommendations that stem from the formal
57. The following description of judicial qualification commissions is drawn from JUDI-
CIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL, supra note 6, at 4.
58. Id
59. Id
60. Federal Judges, supra note 19, at 324.
61. Id
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hearing. Thus, the Commission system provides for an informal and a
formal, three-staged evaluation of charges.
Third, the Commission system provides for flexibility of sanction by
allowing for removal, retirement or other disciplinary action. The re-
sult should be that sanctions are more appropriately meted out to fit the
infraction. Also, individuals may be more willing to lodge complaints
when it is clear that sanctions can fall short of removal from office.
Finally, the Commission system is more efficient on a case-by-case
basis than the traditional approaches because the participation of the
full legislature or electorate is not required. However, it is necessarily
more expensive than the court system, which, because it is convened
only when complaints are ified, does not have the Commission's per-
manent staff costs.
Whether or not these costs are justifiable depends on the volume of
complaints that need to be screened. As the volume of complaints in-
creases, the function served by the staff should become more cost effec-
tive, for they can eliminate groundless charges without invoking the
full court procedure.
In conclusion, it appears that the Commission system remedies many
of the problems that plague the other approaches discussed earlier.
However, because it requires a permanent staff, it may also be more
expensive in the long run.
IV. JUDICIAL TENURE ACT PROCEDURE
A4. The Procedure as Outlined in the Judicial Tenure Act
The procedure outlined by the Judicial Tenure Act is intended to
"establish within the judicial branch of government a system for inves-
tigating and resolving allegations that the condition or conduct of
members of the Federal judiciary is or has been inconsistent with the
good behavior required under Article III, section 1 of the Constitution
of the United States."6 z
The disciplinary system proposed by this legislation63 has three com-
ponents. First, there is a committee for each of the circuits and each of
the special national courts (Court of Claims, Court of Customs and
62. S. REP. No. 1035, supra note 3, at 1-2.
63. There is a slightly different procedure proposed for dealing with the condition or con-
duct of Supreme Court Justices. Two main differences exist. First, the committees are not
involved. All investigation is conducted by the Commission. Second, at the end of formal
hearings by the Court on Judicial Conduct and Disability, it only recommends to the House
of Representatives that it either censure, impeach or dismiss the charges against the justice.
These recommendations are not subject to judicial review. Id at 2-3.
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Patent Appeals, and Customs Court).' The chief judge of each circuit
or court serves as the presiding officer of the committee that is com-
prised of appellate and, when appropriate, trial court judges from that
circuit or court. Second, there is a Judicial Conduct and Disability
Commission. The Commission is comprised of one member elected by
each circuit and one member elected collectively by the special national
courts. Third, there is a Court on Judicial Conduct and Disability.
The court is comprised of seven members of the Judicial Conference of
the United States. The presiding officer of the court is elected by the
Judicial Conference, who in turn selects the other six members.
Complaints are filed with the Judicial Conduct and Disability Com-
mission, which may either dismiss a complaint65 or refer it to the ap-
propriate circuit/court committee. The committee then investigates the
complaint and recommends that the Commission dismiss the com-
plaint, investigate the complaint further, or give the committee a rea-
sonable period of time to address the matter alleged in the complaint.
If the Commission finds sufficient evidence that the condition or con-
duct of the judge may be inconsistent with the constitutional good be-
havior requirement, it recommends that the Court on Judicial Conduct
and Disability hold a formal hearing. After a hearing, which must
comply with certain due process requirements specified in the Act, the
Court may order involuntary retirement, removal, censure, or dismissal
of charges. Either the Commission or the judge may seek review in the
Supreme Court by petitioning for a writ of certiorari. All proceedings
prior to the time the Commission makes its recommendation are confi-
dential.
B. Evaluation of the Procedure
At the end of the third section, judicial qualification commission sys-
tems, in general, were evaluated. In the following subsections, the dif-
ferences in evaluation that result from the peculiarities of the system
proposed in the Judicial Tenure Act will be discussed. Issues idiosyn-
cratic to the Act will also be discussed.
1. Does the Procedure Provide Sufficient Confidentiality?
The confidentiality procedure proposed in the Act does not vary
from the procedures generally used in Commission plans. Both pro-
64. The following description of the procedure proposed in the Judicial Tenure Act is
drawn from S. REP. No. 1035, supra note 3, at 2-3.
65. Preventing premature injury to judges' reputations is one of the goals of this legisla-
tion. Id at 32.
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vide for confidentiality at all but the final stages of the process. It could
be argued plausibly that the confidentiality provision should be
dropped entirely. It could be argued just as plausibly that it should be
extended through the end of the process. The former position could be
supported by the argument that, since public confidence in the judici-
ary can be one of the by-products of an effective tenure system, it
should be encouraged by making the process open and thus available
for public scrutiny. If decisions on misconduct are made public at
every stage, there would be little opportunity for claims that the judici-
ary was collusively protecting its own by sidestepping legitimate claims.
Unfortunately, such a process could also have the effect of unjustifiably
damaging the reputations of those jurists who are ultimately found in-
nocent of all charges. It is often the case that the public will remember
charges of misconduct, but either forget or not bother to determine the
ultimate resolution.
The equally persuasive argument that the entire process should be
confidential also has its pitfalls. Such an argument urges that, since the
final resolution on guilt or innocence is not made until final Supreme
Court review has been obtained, no information should be released
prior to that point. This argument implicitly suggests that judges' repu-
tations must remain unchallenged in order for judges to be effective.
Since performing one's duties without criticism can give the appear-
ance of being above reproach, such an assertion is not without merit.
However, once the decision is made to investigate and evaluate judicial
misconduct, denying public scrutiny makes it more difficult to maintain
an appearance of proper, non-collusive evaluation.
Thus, two important needs are in conflict-the need to protect judi-
cial reputations from unjust injury and the need to garner public confi-
dence in the fairness of the evaluation process. The procedure
proposed in the Judicial Tenure Act resolves this conflict through com-
promise. Confidentiality is initially maintained in order to protect
against disclosure of obviously insubstantial claims. Openness is pro-
vided in later stages in order to permit public scrutiny. It is hoped that
this balance will prevent premature injury to judges' reputations
66
while maintaining public confidence.
66. "The executive director of the commission screens all complaints after they are filed
in order to dismiss, without prejudice, any that are improperly verified or subscribed. After
preliminary inquiry, the executive director shall dismiss, with prejudice, any complaint
which is frivolous or outside the jurisdiction of the commission." Id at 21.
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2. Does the Procedure Provide an Effective System for the
Evaluation of Charges?
The procedure proposed in the Judicial Tenure Act is virtually the
same as the general Commission plan, except for two modifications.
The first of the two modifications, the addition of a committee of
judges, was included because "the facts concerning the alleged conduct
...are more likely to be available in the circuit or court of the judge
against whom a complaint has been lodged rather than from investiga-
tive efforts monitored by a national commission. ' 67 Since the commit-
tee merely makes recommendations to the Judicial Conduct and
Evaluation Commission rather than making the final decision, the op-
portunity for both the fact and appearance of impropriety is avoided
even though the judge is being investigated by his closest peers (ie.,
same circuit or court).
The second modification is the use of the Court on Judicial Conduct
and Disability. Any charges that the Commission (after input from the
Commission staff and the appropriate committee)68 finds to be sup-
ported by sufficient evidence are recommended for hearing before the
court.69 Thus, unlike the general commission plan, the Act provides for
a hearing by an agency other than the Commission itself. As a result,
the difficult situation that exists when the same agency both prosecutes
and adjudicates a claim does not occur. Also, the perspective of yet
another group of people is brought to bear on the problem of determin-
ing guilt or innocence.
Theoretically, the plan proposed in the Act, like the general Com-
mission plan, provides an effective evaluation procedure. The fact that
evaluation is multistaged lends credibility to the proposition that the
system will ascertain the truth, due to the fact that several groups of
people evaluate the charge. Furthermore, each of the stages in the
process serves as a check upon the preceding one.
Unfortunately, the evaluation procedure outlined in the Act does not
provide for the involvement of lay people, except in the filing of com-
plaints.7" This may be a weakness in the Act because the appearance of
67. Id.
68. After the committee conducts its investigation, it recommends that the Commission
either dismiss the complaint, initiate its own investigation, or allow the committee to address
the matter raised in the complaint itself. Id at 24.
69. Id at 25.
70. While some of the State disciplinary review systems have included laymen or non-
judicial members, this usually has required an amendment of the State constitution.
Further, the Committee on the Judiciary believes that the judges themselves are in the
best position to determine whether the condition or conduct of members of the judiciary
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propriety may be as important as its existence. The inclusion of lay
members on the Commission would support this appearance. The par-
ticipation of lay people in the process would help alleviate any con-
cerns that the profession was protecting its own rather than searching
out and punishing misconduct. While it does not completely solve the
problem of lack of lay participation, the fact that proceedings before
the Court on Judicial Conduct and Disability are open to public scru-
tiny (i e., no confidentiality) may reduce some of the public's potential
concerns. Although lay people are not involved in the decision-making
process, the openness of that process tends to expose any collusion and
thus greatly reduce the probability of both the fact and appearance of
impropriety.
3. Does the Procedure Provide Sufficiently Flexible Sanctions?
One of the crucial problems with all of the other approaches to judi-
cial tenure is the lack of flexibility of sanction. As previously stated,
the procedure outlined under the Act provides for removal or censure
of judges found to be in violation of the good behavior standard of the
United States Constitution.7' It also permits involuntary retirement of
judges eligible to retire who are found to be permanently disabled
(mentally or physically).72
This ability to vary the sanction is perhaps the most novel and valua-
ble feature of the procedure proposed in the Judicial Tenure Act. It
allows the Commission to chastise misconduct that falls short of that
requiring removal. Absent such flexibility with respect to choice of
sanction, minor infractions would either go entirely unpunished or be
punished greatly out of proportion to the harm caused.
4. Does the Procedure Provide an Efficient Means for the
Discipline and Removal of Federal Judges?
As mentioned earlier, traditional approaches require either the full
attention of a legislature or a full recall or election process in order to
determine whether misconduct has occurred. Courts on the judiciary,
on the other hand, require only a court composed of a small number of
judicial officials. The commission system proposed by the Judicial
Tenure Act falls somewhere between the two in terms of the number of
is inconsistent with the good behavior requirement of article III, section 1, of the Con-
stitution of the United States.
Id at 19-20.
71. Id at 32.
72. Id at 45.
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people and probable expense required in order to evaluate judicial con-
duct.
It is relatively clear that the traditional approaches are both ineffi-
cient and ineffective in evaluating charges. That apparently is not the
case with the courts on the judiciary, for they are clearly efficient in
both economic and human resources. They are also able to evaluate
charges effectively. The difference between the Judicial Tenure Act's
commission system and the court on the judiciary plan clearly lies in
the use of preliminary investigation and screening procedures.
Assuming, arguendo, that both systems are in fact equally capable of
evaluating charges, the efficiency of one over the other must be deter-
mined in light of the number of claims that need be addressed. The
greater the number of claims, the more efficient it becomes to use a
preliminary investigation and evaluation process. However, there are
other alternatives. The courts on the judiciary often place limits upon
the number of people who will be eligible to register claims. Such lim-
its can serve the same purpose as the preliminary investigation and
evaluation; they control the number of cases that must be tried.
Although limiting the number of people who may file claims may be
an efficient use of resources, there are inherent problems in such a sys-
tem. First, those who are allowed to file charges are necessarily doing
their own preliminary evaluation. Without the resources and safe-
guards of a formal procedure and/or agency, such evaluations can be
more problematic than advantageous. Second, denying most citizens
the opportunity to fie claims may appear to be an attempt to hide, or at
least not punish, misconduct. Given a sufficient number of charges to
warrant any screening process, the specific approach posed in the Judi-
cial Tenure Act seems a viable solution. If, on the other hand, there are
relatively few complaints to process, the costs inherent in maintaining a
permanent commission for the purpose of preliminarily screening com-
plaints seems an unnecessary expense.
5. Does the Procedure Violate the Constitution in that
Impeachment Is the Only Permissible Way to Remove
Federal Judges/Justices?
Even if the procedure proposed in the Judicial Tenure Act is accept-
able in terms of confidentiality, evaluation of charges, flexibility of
sanction, and overall efficiency, it still may be subject to other valid
attacks. Not least among these criticisms is that it is unconstitutional.73
73. Other criticisms are discussed in subsequent sections.
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A relatively recent case dealing with the permissibility of alternatives
to impeachment is Chandler v. Judicial Council.74 In Chandler, Justices
Douglas and Black suggested in their dissenting opinions75 that the
only permissible procedure for the removal of federal judges or justices
is impeachment. This position finds historical support in the Federalist
Papers. In Federalist No. 79, Alexander Hamilton stated that "[tihe
precautions for their [federal judges'] responsibility are comprised in
the article respecting impeachments.
' 7 6
Furthermore, it has been suggested that, according to the maxim of
constitutional construction "expressio unius est exclusio alterius, ' '77 im-
peachment is the only permissible way to remove federal judges.78
This line of reasoning relies upon the argument that since impeach-
ment is the only removal procedure mentioned in the Constitution, it is
the only one that may be validly utilized.
As might be expected, there are also arguments on the other side of
the issue. It has been suggested that the mere fact that Congress has the
sole power of impeachment does not necessarily indicate that Congress
also has the sole power of removal.79 Carrying this further, it has been
suggested that since Congress does not have the sole power of removal,
and since there are no provisions preventing the judiciary from "clean-
ing its own house," the non-impeachment procedure in the Judicial
Tenure Act is constitutionally permissible.80
Another line of reasoning also supports the constitutionality of the
Judicial Tenure Act. It has been argued that the good behavior stan-
dard of article III, section 1 is as applicable to federal judges as is the
high crimes and misdemeanors standard of article II, section 4. If only
impeachment (under article II, section 4) is permitted, then the stan-
dard of article III, section 1 is redundant and would therefore have no
effect. Such an outcome is contrary to long standing rules of constitu-
tional interpretation, which require that each constitutional provision
74. 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
75. Id at 136 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 142 (Black, J., dissenting).
76. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 474 (2d printing, New American Library of World Litera-
ture, 1964).
77. This is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as follows: "[e]xpression of one thing is the
exclusion of another." (citations omitted). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 692 (rev. 4th ed.
1968). Black's further states that "[u]nder this maxim, if statute specifies one exception to a
general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or
effects are excluded" (citations omitted). Id
78. Andrews, supra note 14, at 158; 124 CONG. REC. S14,753 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978)
(remarks of Sen. Bayh).
79. E.g., Andrews, supra note 14, at 159; Nunn, supra note 1, at 31.
80. Nunn, supra note 1, at 30.
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be given meaning."'
Clearly, there are two strong, yet diametrically opposed arguments
on the constitutionality of the Judicial Tenure Act. If passed, the reso-
lution of the conflict will be, appropriately, the province of the
Supreme Court.
6. Does the Good Behavior Standard Provide Sufficient Guidance
to the Commission?
The Judicial Tenure Act states that conduct inconsistent with the
good behavior requirement of the Constitution includes "but is not lim-
ited to willful misconduct in office, willful and persistent failure to per-
form duties of the office, habitual intemperance, or other conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office
into disrepute. '8 2 This definition has been subject to two major criti-
cisms. First, it has been suggested that this definition is comprised of
"broad, vague terms at best."83 Second, it has been argued that be-
cause of the definition utilized it would be possible "to remove a judge
gilty of obscene conversations with relative ease, but being able to get
rid of a judge who has committed murder or treason or accepted bribes
[could] only [be accomplished] through impeachment."
8 4
With regard to the first contention, it appears that the terms in the
definition are in fact not unreasonably vague. The committee report on
this bill85 included examples of actionable misconduct under each of
the terms in the definition.86 Also, states that have employed these
terms in conjunction with their own removal procedures have found
them clear enough to guide disciplinary action.87 If several states can
take action without successful constitutional challenge the terms are ar-
guably sufficiently clear. Furthermore, since examples of behavior fall-
ing within each definitional term were part of the senate committee's
report, the legislative intent is relatively clear.
Finally, as to the second criticism, it may not be the case that the
81. Id at 31.
82. S. REP. No. 1035, supra note 3, at 32.
83. 124 CONG. REc. S14,765 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
84. Id
85. S. REP. No. 1035, supra note 3.
86. Id at 34-36.
87. In construing these terms, state courts have sometimes had to look to other standards
of judicial conduct. For example, in construing the term "willful misconduct," the North
Carolina Supreme Court looked to "the traditions, heritage, and generally recognized prac-
tices of the courts and the legal profession, the common and statutory law, codes of judicial
conduct, and traditional notions of judicial ethics." In re Edens, 290 N.C. 299, 306, 226
S.E.2d 5, 9 (1976).
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good behavior standard and the high crimes and misdemeanors stan-
dard will be enforced by different procedures (commission or impeach-
ment) that potentially would make one more easily enforceable than
the other. Since it has been suggested that impeachment trials have
utilized both standards, it can be argued that the two criteria have
merged.8 As a result of the fact that the committee report on the Judi-
cial Tenure Act merely gives examples of misbehavior rather than an
all inclusive list,89 one might argue that the merger works in both direc-
tions, resulting in both criteria being enforced by the commission sys-
tem as well as by the impeachment process. If such is the case, and if
either procedure may be used for either category of offense, removal
would not be easier for one offense than for another.
7. Is the Procedure an Unwarranted Intrusion upon Judicial
Independence?
The Judicial Tenure Act has been attacked as an "ominous threat" to
American society.9° Such a characterization is based on the belief that,
"[t]o allow any simpler process [than impeachment] for judicial re-
moval, even one under the control of judges themselves, who [sic,
would] eviscerate the independence of the individuals on the bench." 9'
Further, it has been suggested that judges might not feel secure in tak-
ing positions contrary to what their fellow judges approve, for fear of
invoking the Act. 92
In opposition to these suggestions, it has been urged that the issue of
judicial independence relates only to independence from the other two
branches of government.93 Since the Act only provides procedures for
intra-judicial scrutiny, rather than extra-judicial scrutiny, it has been
argued that it cannot be considered an invasion upon the right of judi-
cial independence.94
In light of the extreme rarity of impeachment, it is apparent that ad-
ditional procedures for the discipline and removal of judges are re-
quired. The fact that the proposed procedure is both under judicial
control and ultimately open to public scrutiny would clearly seem to
allow less potential for abuse than would be the case under more tradi-
88. Removing Federal Judges, supra note 2, at 418.
89. S. REP. No. 1035, supra note 3, at 34-36.
90. Report of speech by United States Court of Appeals Judge Irving R. Kaufman. L.A.
Daily J., November 7, 1978, at 1, col. 3.
91. Id
92. 124 CONG. REC. S14,755, S14,762 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
93. Nunn, supra note 1, at 31.
94. Id
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tional disciplinary alternatives. Although merely reducing the poten-
tial for abuse does not completely remove the "ominous threat," it does
bring it within tolerable limits. The alternative to accepting even a mi-
nor potential for abuse is to maintain the status quo. The status quo is
an unacceptably low incidence of the utilization of disciplinary proce-
dures.
Anthony Russo

